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Treaty Interpretation Under a Covenant Paradigm
Jared I. Mayer

Abstract
Treaty interpretation has long drawn from the practice of contract interpretation. This is
because, structurally speaking, treaties and contracts share many features. While the contract
paradigm of treaty interpretation may work well for “ordinary” treaties—that is, treaties that
have relatively low transaction costs for negotiating and renegotiating, whose fallout would not
produce possibly disastrous consequences, and whose contents reify other, previously instantiated
commitments between the parties—there is reason to doubt its efficacy with respect to
“momentous” treaties. Momentous treaties are those whose transaction costs are tremendously
high, fallout from which would jeopardize critical international security and prosperity goals, and
that are often not supported by previous treaties securing the same or similar goals. Since the
contract paradigm of interpretation largely focuses on the text of a treaty, it might be ill-suited to
promote trust between the parties, which is especially important for maintaining momentous
treaties. I argue that when it comes to interpreting momentous treaties, international institutions
should opt for a “covenant paradigm of interpretation” over the contract paradigm of
interpretation. Drawing on historical and anthropological work on the ancient Near East and
Bible, I provide an account of “covenant interpretation” that calls on interpreters to focus not only
on the text, but also on the parties’ broader shared history and normative values. Using this
paradigm, international institutions can remedy contract interpretation’s trust-building deficit.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
In both common and civil law jurisdictions, treaties have been interpreted
and conceptualized through the framework of contracts. Such a paradigm is
embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention).1 That treaty, which governs treaty interpretation for future treaties,
utilizes tools that originate in the realm of contract interpretation, such as the
primacy of good faith in treaty fulfillment.2 Interestingly, the Vienna Convention
adopts a contract-style method for resolving treaty breaches; it absolves parties of
a particular treaty obligation when another bound party breaches that obligation.3
In both treaty interpretation and breach resolution, then, contract interpretation
serves as the critical conceptual paradigm.
For many, indeed most, treaties, the contract paradigm fits well. Investment
treaties, for example, are treaties for which the contract paradigm is well-suited.
They have been more frequently renegotiated since their increased use beginning
in the 1990s.4 Renegotiation of these treaties comes at a relatively low cost since
renegotiation aims to clarify or further specify the goals laid out in the initial
treaties. It may also be that breaching these treaties will not result in any adverse
effects to the breaching or non-breaching parties. This is because the parties have
other agreements that essentially “copy” the breached investment treaty’s terms,
thus leaving the investment arrangement between the parties intact.
Focusing on these features highlights the fact that some treaties are different
in kind than the investment treaties just mentioned. These are what I coin as
momentous treaties. Unlike ordinary treaties, momentous treaties feature
tremendously high transaction costs when it comes to negotiation and
renegotiation. This can be due to the treaty being politically charged within a
party’s domestic politics or, more broadly, the fact that fallout from the treaty can
lead to dire consequences and thus the treaty is tremendously risky. Because
negotiation is so costly, momentous treaties will seldom stand upon previous,
underlying agreements that can support the treaty in the event of a breach. Nuclear
1

2

3

4

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
See generally MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES 47(2009) (highlighting the historical relationship between treaties and contracts).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 60. It is important to note that Article 60 allows parties to
abrogate their responsibilities only upon unanimous consent of all of the non-breaching parties
involved. Article 60, however, allows parties who are uniquely, adversely affected by the initial
breach to subsequently breach the treaty; it grants the same privilege to all parties if the breach were
to “radically change[ ] the position of every party” to the treaty. Id. at art. 60(2)(b)–(c).
Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time – Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a
Changing World, in OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2015). Available
online at http://perma.cc/4PVV-4MSR.
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non-proliferation treaties largely feature these dynamics and will therefore be my
central example of momentous treaties.
Fallout from such a breach is partly driven precisely by the Vienna
Convention’s contractual paradigm. As I argue, the Vienna Convention’s Article
60, in following the “breach of contract” paradigm, allows parties to escape from
their treaty commitments’ grasp, irrespective of whether the breached
commitment is ordinary or momentous. This, in turn, might lead to fallout from
the treaty that entirely negates the treaty’s purpose, leading to dire consequences.
In the nuclear non-proliferation context, for example, one nation’s breach of the
treaty can lead other signatory nations to breach the treaty as well.5 To ensure that
parties will perform their obligations, momentous treaties might place a premium
on building trust between the parties that is simply not necessary with ordinary
treaties.
The Vienna Convention’s fidelity to the contractual paradigm of treaty
interpretation further exacerbates the unique issues that may arise for momentous
treaties. While a treaty is to be interpreted broadly with an eye towards the goal
for which it was established,6 treaty interpretation fundamentally rests upon the
treaty’s text with the understanding that the text is the “authentic expression of
the intentions of the parties.”7 This may work well with an ordinary treaty, whose
transaction costs for renegotiation are relatively low and whose provisions are
secured by other, overlapping agreements. Yet because a momentous treaty has
high transaction costs for renegotiation and does not have overlapping, alternative
arrangements that secure the treaty’s goals, emphasizing the discrete text of the
treaty may leave a momentous treaty interpretively “under-supported,” as it were,
rendering its provisions relatively insecure upon a party’s breach.
This Comment’s solution to these interpretive problems is to shift treaty
interpretation from a contract paradigm to a covenant paradigm. “Covenant
paradigm” refers to an interpretive framing that largely draws from political
arrangements commonly found in the Hebrew Bible and in ancient Near-Eastern
societies. I create an account of covenant interpretation focuses on three features
that distinguish it from contract interpretation: the centrality of kinship,
impossibility of treaty dissolution, and normative evolution and holism.
The first two features refer to covenants’ dynamic temporal character.
“Centrality of kinship” draws on a legal-fictional conception of “blood relations”
5

6
7

See, for example, Parisa Hafezi, Iran Further Breaches Nuclear Deal, Says It Can Exceed 20% Enrichment,
REUTERS, (Sept. 7, 2019), http://perma.cc/6XZG-D4VY (highlighting how the U.S.’s breach of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) enticed Iran to breach the JCPOA and enrich its
uranium to be used for nuclear weapons).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31(1)–(2).
I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 71 (1973).
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between covenantal partners to indicate that the parties are obligated to see
themselves as intertwined with one another in the treaty’s joint venture.8 Thus, it
focuses on the parties’ shared history, with an emphasis on how and why the
parties came together to form the treaty at hand. A corollary to this point is
“impossibility of treaty dissolution.” Since the foundation of the covenant is the
“blood relation,” as it were, between the parties, there cannot be a “sunset clause”
or other stipulation that a covenant will end. Similarly, the parties cannot breach
a covenant and thereby render it non-binding for the other parties, unless that
breach fundamentally challenges the “blood relation” between the parties.
The third feature of covenant interpretation refers to their distinctly dynamic
normative character. Unlike contracts, which must be tethered to the particular
obligations stipulated by the parties at the time of contracting, covenants can
extend over time to create new obligations for the parties.9 All of those
obligations, in turn, reinforce each other. The covenant’s text merely serves as a
springboard for synthesizing a variety of sources, including the parties’ shared
history and normative values, that hang together holistically. Given momentous
treaties’ high transaction costs for renegotiation, using interpretive methods that
reach beyond the text might be helpful in preserving the scheme that the treaty
was meant to create. This means looking towards not only the treaty’s purpose,
but also to the parties’ shared history and values to help regenerate trust between
them. To illustrate these points, I review Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom,10 an
opinion issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), showing how a
covenant paradigm would contrast with the Court’s approach. Idiosyncratic as the
covenant paradigm may be, I also argue that this approach is not far off from the
ICJ’s approach in its peculiar majority advisory opinion in Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons.11 In using covenant interpretation and the tools that it
provides, institutions can help create a web of commitments that support the
momentous treaty’s goals. In so doing, institutions can remedy the unique
shortcomings that the contract paradigm of interpretation has for interpreting
momentous treaties.

8

9

10

11

See FRANK MOORE CROSS, FROM EPIC TO CANON: HISTORY AND LITERATURE IN ANCIENT ISRAEL
3–4 (1998).
As this Comment shows, the evolution of the parties’ obligations cannot be accommodated by the
Vienna Convention’s use of “course of performance” in treaty interpretation. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31(3).
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 833 (Oct. 5).
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Jul. 8).
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II. T REATY AS C ONTRACT
To establish the strong connection between treaty and contract
interpretation, I will first show the historical and contemporary conceptual
relationship between treaties and contracts. It will do so by highlighting the
parallels between how contracts and treaties are interpreted, as well as how
contracts and treaties may be suspended and terminated. Drawing this conceptual
parallel between treaties and contracts is by no means novel.12 Grotius plainly
referred to treaties as “a [s]ort of [c]ontract”; that is, treaties must be
conceptualized under a contract paradigm.13 In the U.S., this conceptual
relationship between contracts and treaties has been enshrined in law: “[a] treaty
is in the nature of a contract between two nations, not a legislative act.”14 Recent
scholars, too, have defended this conceptual parallel. As Russell Hardin of New
York University has noted, “[t]reaties are roughly analogous to contract and
mutual promises. Like contracts, they are formal; like promises, they are backed
by no higher authority. We enter into promises, contracts, and treaties because
each party expects to gain as a result.”15 Given these features, some scholars have
concluded that treaty-making is a form of private ordering between nations that
can be used to resolve collective action problems, such as prisoners’ dilemmas.16

A. Interpretation
The relationship between contracts and treaties extends to the realm of
interpretation.17 Treaty interpretation, as performed today, has largely utilized
concepts and idioms from both common and civil law contracts jurisprudence,
beginning with the normative goals of treaty interpretation.18 International law
12

13

14
15

16

17

18

A treaty, under the Vienna Convention, is “an international agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” See Vienna Convention,
supra note 1, at art. 2.1(a).
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 820 (Richard Tuck, ed., John Morrice, et al.,
trans., 2005) (1625).
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
Russell Hardin, Contracts, Promises and Arms Control, 40 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 14 (Oct.
1984).
See, for example, Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a
Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 423, 450–54 (2014).
For a succinct account of the historical relationship between contract and treaty interpretations, see
ERIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 99–105 (2014).
This Comment focuses on English, French, German, and American doctrines in contract law. This
is because these jurisdictions represent the key doctrinal differences between the common and civil
law traditions. Indeed, these traditions are so influential worldwide that “one need not go
outside . . . . some well-known—albeit ill-defined—contrasts between Anglo-American (common
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scholars have long debated the methods that international institutions should
adopt when interpreting treaties. These methodological debates, in turn, point to
what these scholars take to the be normative goals of treaty interpretation. As Sir
Humphrey Waldock has noted, scholars
differ to some extent in their basic approach to the interpretation of treaties
according to the relative weight which they give to—
(a) the text of the treaty as the authentic expression of the intention of the
parties;
(b) the intentions of the parties as a subjective element distinct from the text;
and
(c) the declared or apparent objects or purposes of the treaty.19

These debates are mirrored in the context of European contract law.20 The
French system on the one hand, and the English and German systems on the
other hand, depart from one another in whether the aim of contract interpretation
is to secure the parties’ common intention (per the French system) or rather to
impute a meaning to the contract that a reasonable person would impute (per the
English and German systems).21 Moreover, some English courts are inclined to
take a “purposivist” approach when a commercial contract’s terms would fly in
the face of ordinary business sense.22
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention attempts to provide a solution to these
methodological debates. Article 31.1 calls on courts to interpret treaties “in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”23 On its face,
Article 31.1 marks the treaty’s text as the departure point for any interpretive
inquiry. This is further confirmed by the Commentary to the Draft Articles, which
champions the text and eschews discovering any intent independent of the text:
the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intention of
the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is

19

20

21
22

23

law) and Continental (civil-law) systems of procedure.” MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 10 (1991).
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 at
218 (1966); see also SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 70–73 (1973)
[hereinafter Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n] (discussing the methodological debates on the question
of treaty interpretation. But see VILLIGER, supra note 2, at 421–22 (identifying five approaches to
treaty interpretation).
See Stefan Vogenauer, Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative Observations, in CONTRACT
TERMS 123, 130–35 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel, eds. 2007).
Id. at 127–29.
See Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna AB, [1985] AC 191 (HL), at 201 (U.K.) (per
Lord Diplock).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1.

200

Vol. 21 No. 1

Treaty Interpretation

Mayer

the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into
the intentions of the parties.24

Article 31.2 clarifies that a treaty’s context is constituted by the treaty’s preamble
and related agreements that all of the present parties have accepted.25 Beyond the
context, Article 31.3 mandates that courts take into account the parties’
subsequent agreements, subsequent implementation of the present treaty, and any
other international law provisions that apply to the parties.26 These provisions help
navigate the adjudicating body between “a strictly textual approach which would
naturally give the terms of a treaty their original significance, and a purely
teleological approach which would allow for the effect of an evolution of the law
on the interpretation of legal terms.”27 Textualism with a tinge of teleology,
therefore, marks treaty interpretation’s fundamental structure.
What, then, of intentions? Those are relegated to “supplementary means of
interpretation,” which under Article 32, may be used “in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31,” or when the interpretation
stemming from Article 31 methods results in a an absurd, unreasonable,
ambiguous, or obscure interpretation.28 As the commentary to the Draft Articles
notes, listing intentions as “supplementary” affirms the fact that Article 32 “does
not provide for alternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for
means to aid an interpretation governed by the principles contained” in Article
31.29 While treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention primarily adopts
textual and teleological methods, it also leaves room for the parties intentions to
factor into the interpretive analysis when ambiguities arise.30
Contract interpretation follows a similar structure. In both German and
English contract interpretation, the text of a contract is primary.31 In a manner
similar to Article 32, where the text leaves ambiguity in the interpretation, courts

24

25
26
27

28
29
30

31

UN General Assembly, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 1966 Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 187, 220 [hereinafter Draft Articles].
Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
Id.
Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 331
(1969); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 7, at 75–76 (noting that contract interpretation is primarily to
be characterized as textual and teleological).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
Draft Articles, supra note 24, at 223.
C.f. Peter McRae, The Search for Meaning: Continuing Problems with the Interpretation of Treaties, 33
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 209 (2002) (discussing which methods of interpretation the ICJ
has adopted with regards to treaties).
Vogenauer, supra note 20, at 134.
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are inclined to look to the parties’ intent independently of the contract’s text.32
“Modern” English contracts jurisprudence slightly departs from this standard, to
be sure, as the emphasis on the text’s objectivity is softened by the English courts
interpreting contracts to accord with “common sense” or, in commercial settings,
“business commonsense.”33 In the American context, courts are also exhorted to
read the contract “objectively,” giving great weight to the text when interpreting
a contract.34 Nonetheless, courts should also give “great weight” to the parties’
“principal purpose” in forming the contract if that purpose is discernable.35 What
is more, courts should interpret the contract according to how the parties altered
their contractual agreement (perhaps far more widely than is allowed under the
Vienna Convention) via a change in the course of performance of the contract.36
Despite differences between these jurisdictions’ contract jurisprudences, the
conceptual framework used to craft Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
stems, primarily, from a contract paradigm.
The doctrinal importance of good faith, a hallmark of contract interpretation
across both common and civil law regimes, also shines through in the Vienna
Convention. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention provides, “Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”37
This principle, known as pacta sunt servanda, “is the fundamental principle of the
law of treaties.”38 This prohibits a party from avoiding a treaty obligation “by a
merely literal application of the [treaty’s] clauses.”39 Indeed, this principle fuels
Article 31’s requirement that treaties be interpreted in good faith.40 Contract law
across common and civil law systems reflects a premium placed on good faith, as
well. Indeed, pacta sunt servanda has been part and parcel of civil contract law since
its “founding.”41 This is reflected in contemporary civil contract law, such as in
32

33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40

41

Id. at 132–34. In this respect, French contract interpretation remains the outlier, as it focuses more
squarely upon the parties’ joint will. Id.
Id. at 40.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 33(1), 202(3), 203(a), 204, 222 (Am. Law Inst.
1981).
Id. at § 202(1).
See id. at § 223; see also 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.16 (2019).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 19, at 211.
Id.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1; see also Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 19,
at 221.
See SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE
109 (Ian Hunter & David Saunders, eds., Andrew Tooke, trans., 2003) (1673) (“[I]t is an obligation
of the Law of Nature, that every Man keep his Word, or fulfill his Promises and make good his
Contracts.”) (emphases in original). For a fascinating discussion of this maxim’s development
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§ 242 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, which provides a cause of action for
subpar performance even if that performance falls within the technical letter of
the parties’ contract.42 American contract law, under the influence of Professor
Karl Llewellyn, has adopted a version of the German doctrine of good faith.43
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-304,44 as well as Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205,45 reflects similar requirements that the parties fulfill their
contractual obligations in good faith. Though English contract law has been
resistant to the broad notion of good faith, recent developments in the field of
“unfairness” have catalyzed developments in English contract law that mimic the
doctrine of good faith.46 The doctrine of good faith, then, is yet another
conceptual bridge between contract and treaty law.

B. Suspension and Termination
The Vienna Convention draws an important distinction between when
treaties may be terminated and when they may be suspended.47 Termination
“[r]eleases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty”;48
suspension, by contrast, releases the parties from their treaty obligations with each
other for some period of time.49 Unlike termination of a treaty, however,

42

43

44
45
46

47

48

49

throughout the civil law tradition, see Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J.
INT’L L. 405 (1994).
See Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law, in
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 171, 172–75 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman,
eds. 1997).
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW 153, 154–56, supra note 42.
U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 34, at § 205.
See Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman, Introduction: From ‘Classical’ to Modern Contract Law, in GOOD
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 3, 14–17, supra note 42; see also Susan Bright, Unfairness and
the Consumer Contract Regulations, in CONTRACT TERMS 173, 180–84, supra note 20.
Vienna Convention, supra note 1. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 V.A. L. REV. 1579,
1613–29 (2005) (discussing the important differences between breach of treaty and exit/termination
of treaty).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 70. To be sure, the Vienna Convention provides limitations
on when a party may initially withdraw from a treaty, that is, terminate a treaty for itself not in
response to another party’s withdrawal. Under those limitations, a party may only terminate a treaty
if the parties intended to afford each other the possibility of terminating the treaty or if the right to
withdraw from the treaty is implicit in the treaty’s nature. See id. at art. 56. These limitations,
however, apply only when the treaty does not itself address the possibility of withdrawal from the
treaty. Given that parties need to simply address withdrawal within the treaty in order to overcome
Article 56’s analysis, Article 56 serves as little restraint on the parties’ abilities to withdraw from
their treaty.
Id. at art. 72.
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suspension requires parties to “refrain from acts tending to obstruct the
resumption of the operation of the treaty.”50
Terminating or suspending a treaty begins when a party materially breaches
the treaty. In other words, the party openly repudiates the contract in a way that
is not sanctioned by the Vienna Convention or violates a provision of the treaty
“essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”51 If the
treaty is bilateral, then upon breach, the party not in breach may disregard the
treaty.52 To this extent, the Vienna Convention largely mirrors the conceptual
tools used to understand breach of contract.
With multilateral treaties, the Vienna Convention provides numerous
avenues for discerning whether and to what extent a treaty may be disregarded by
the parties not in breach. A treaty will terminate or be suspended if all other parties
not in breach agree to terminate or suspend it, respectively.53 Article 60.2 provides
two alternative avenues to suspending, but not terminating, a treaty. A treaty may
be suspended with respect to one or more of the parties if those parties are
“specifically affected by the breach”54 or if the breach “radically changes the
position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations
under the treaty.”55 To be sure, a party claiming that its treaty obligation is nullified
due to a material breach must follow the notification and adjudication procedures
provided in Articles 65 through 68.56 Notwithstanding these quite important
procedures,57 treaty breaches are conceptualized in ways that are almost identical
to how breaches of contract are conceptualized.
The themes of materiality, conditional performance, and the distinction
between termination and suspension are longstanding parts of both common and
civil law regimes. Both common and civil law regimes allow termination of a
contract upon breach only if that breach is “material.”58 Though the terminology

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58

Id. at art. 72.2.
Id. at art. 60.3.
Id. at art. 60.1.
Id. at art. 60.2(a).
Id. at art. 60.2(b).
Id. at art. 60.2(c).
Id. at 65–68.
For a discussion of the procedures that follow a party’s (questionable) breach of a treaty, see Section
III.C.
See G.H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 350–52
(1988). To be sure, not all jurisdictions use the term “material” to describe the kind of breach
necessary to render the contract unenforceable. Despite the variation in terms—ranging from
“essential” to “deprive [the non-breaching party] of substantially the whole benefit” to “important
ground of termination”—both common and civil law traditions fundamentally agree that
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across regimes varies widely, each party’s contractual obligations are, broadly
speaking, conditional upon the other party’s performance.59 Thus, a breach of one
of those “material” conditions may lead to one of two results. The first, and more
moderate, effect of a material breach is canonized in the civil law tradition under
the maxim exceptio non adimpleti contractus.60 This principle does not allow the nonbreaching party to terminate the contract, but rather “for the time being to refuse to
perform his part.”61 The non-breaching party is excused from its contractual
performance until and unless the party in breach performs adequately or offers to
do so, or if the party in breach defaults, in which case the non-breaching party
may terminate the contract.62 Similarly, in common law jurisdictions, the breaching
party’s ability to possibly “cure” its defective performance, coupled with the fact
that the non-breaching party may only suspend its performance while the
breaching party is given time to cure the defect, suggests a common law corollary
to the exceptio.63 Thus, the exceptio and suspension, and contractual and treaty
termination, are each other’s equivalents in contract and treaty
enforcement, respectively.64

III. M OMENTOUS T REATIES AND C HALLENGING THE
C ONTRACT P ARADIGM
As outlined above, treaties borrow from contract law’s conceptual toolbox
in debates over interpretation, methods of interpretation, and enforcement of
terms. This is why I refer to treaty interpretation as adopting or utilizing a
“contract paradigm.” But it is at this point that I turn to the questions of when
and to what extent this paradigm is most useful and, conversely, where it
deteriorates in the face of unique challenges that arise on the international stage.
This Section argues that while the contract paradigm of treaty interpretation works

59
60
61
62
63
64

termination of contractual duties occurs only when the party in breach breaches the contract in a
uniquely severe way. Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 259–61.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 310 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 313.
As an aside, it is important to note that there is nothing in principle that renders treaties uniquely
susceptible to having multiple parties. Contracts, too, may have arrangements whereby there are
multiple promisors and promisees. See, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 34, at § 9, cmt. c (illustrating the conceptual and practical possibility of having a
multilateral contract).
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well when it comes to ordinary treaties, it falters when applied to momentous
treaties.65

A. Ordinary Treaties
It is first important to identify ordinary treaties’ key properties. One of those
properties is relatively low transaction costs for renegotiating those treaties over
time. Instead of starting anew when one or more parties wish to alter their
previous agreement, parties may simply amend the treaty according to the treaty’s
own terms. Under the Vienna Convention, parties, by and large, may renegotiate
a treaty according to the parties’ own terms.66 Recent data on drafting bilateral
investment treaties has shown that parties frequently renegotiate low-transactioncost treaties. During the early to mid-1990s—immediately after the fall of the
Soviet Union—there was a dramatic rise in the number of these treaties negotiated
between nations.67 While the absolute number of new bilateral investment treaties
has dramatically dropped since that time, and while the absolute number of
renegotiated bilateral investment treaties remains relatively low, “the proportion
of replacements in the overall treaty production has tended to increase since the
early 2000s.”68 This data supports the hypothesis that renegotiating an already
existing treaty has lower transaction costs relative to negotiating an entirely new
treaty. Moreover, given the frequency with which these bilateral investment
treaties are renegotiated—and given that they are often renegotiated to provide
further details on “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security”
between the parties69—the evidence suggests that the marginal benefits of these
renegotiations outweigh the marginal costs of renegotiation. Thus, an ordinary
treaty, such as a bilateral investment treaty, will have relatively low transaction
costs for renegotiation of its terms.
Another important feature of ordinary treaties is that they often reiterate and
therefore support agreements securing the same or similar goals that are already
in play. This may be because by the time ordinary treaties are ratified by the parties,
other agreements, treaties, and shared interests have already created a web of

65

66
67
68
69

It is important to note here that by ordinary, I do not mean to suggest that these treaties are
somehow unimportant or negligible. Indeed, investment treaties are an incredibly important part of
settling investors’ expectations and allocating investment risks in a dynamic global economy. See
Gordon & Pohl, supra note 4, at 9. The features that I identify as being part of ordinary treaties, as
we shall see, speak more to their structural features, not to the goals that they aim to achieve.
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 39.
Gordon & Pohl, supra note 4, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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similar commitments.70 Thus, if one or more of the parties withdraws from the
treaty, those parties may reasonably rely upon the web of similar commitments to
serve as a “safety net” for their interests.71 Investment treaties once again serve as
an illustrative example. Investment treaties between nations generally stipulate,
among other things, that nations will treat investors from the other nations fairly
and equitably. The Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a treaty provision
that parties may insert into their investment treaties that allows private parties to
sue nations when those parties believe that those nations have treated them
unfairly.72 Since private parties—which are, in nearly all cases, multinational
corporations—have presences in many countries, they can reap the benefits of
each country’s ISDS agreements; many of the agreements include arbitration
provisions that entitle an aggrieved party to bring a claim before numerous
adjudicatory bodies.73 Thus, a nation’s withdrawal from one investment treaty will
not substantially reduce foreign investment in that nation.74
The previous point highlights the ways in which breach of ordinary treaties
has relatively low costs for the breaching party. This can be the case irrespective
of the treaty’s goals. If breaching the treaty will not result in a great military,
economic, or natural calamity, yet parties find the treaty to be costly, then holding
everything else constant, parties will be loath to adhere to the treaty simply for
adherence’s sake.75 This is likely to work alongside other previously discussed
elements: low costs for breaching an ordinary treaty might be bolstered because
of myriad opportunities to renegotiate, and the existence of a web of other
commitments might support the fallout from any breach of a treaty. Because of
their low costs and other characteristics, ordinary treaties might therefore be
subject to frequent breaching.
This discussion has assumed a bilateral treaty as the operating model. Could
the same analysis apply to ordinary multilateral treaties? There is good reason to
believe it will. Multilateral treaties, in principle, have the same key features as
70

71

72

73
74
75

See Oran R. Young, Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives, 2 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 6-7 (1996); see also G. Kristen Rosendal, Impacts of Overlapping International Regimes:
The Case of Biodiversity, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 95, 96–98 (2001).
See Brett Ashley Leeds & Burcu Savun, Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?, 69
J. POL. 1118, 1119–20 (2007) (showing the many ways in which a treaty may conclude, including by
mutual recognition that the parties have achieved their goals).
See Clint Peinhardt & Rachel L. Wellhausen, Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Protecting
Investment, 7 GLOBAL POL’Y 571 (2016).
Id. at 572.
Id.
See, for example, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, (U.K. v. Nor.), Order, 1951 I.C.J. 117 (Jan. 10)
(resolving dispute between the U.K. and Norway regarding fishing and territorial rights off the coast
of Norway).

Summer 2020

207

Chicago Journal of International Law

ordinary treaties: low costs for breaching and/or suspending performance, largely
motivated by the fact that there are overlapping agreements that the multilateral
agreement reifies and, further, that the possibility of renegotiation remains.76 To
be sure, multilateral treaties, given that they unify multiple parties under one
scheme, might, in principle, make exiting from them more difficult than exiting
from bilateral treaties.77 Multilateral treaties, however, often times simply “set[ ]
up . . . conventional bond[s] between each of the parties and each of the other
parties, so that breach of a particular provision by one state . . . affects only one
other state.”78 Thus, given that multilateral treaties may, in some sense, be a subset
of bilateral agreements between parties, the earlier analysis for bilateral treaties
seems applicable to multilateral treaties as well.

B. Momentous Treaties
Momentous treaties stand in stark contrast with ordinary treaties. The term
“momentous” is borrowed from, and inspired by, William James in his discussion
of the pragmatics of decision-making and belief acquisition:
If I . . . proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your option would
be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar opportunity, and
your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of
immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your hands. He
who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he
tried and failed.79

One essential element of momentous treaties that this passage highlights is the
rarity of opportunities to create these kinds of treaties. This might be the case for
a number of reasons, one being that the parties to a particular momentous treaty
stand to suffer significantly if the treaty breaks down, or another being that the
treaty is politically controversial within a state party’s domestic politics. Be that as
it may, what partly distinguishes momentous from ordinary treaties is the sheer
risk of, and thus lack of opportunities that parties have to negotiate and ratify,
momentous treaties.
What is more, it should not be surprising that momentous treaties fail to
reaffirm other, earlier agreements that protect the parties’ interests. If a
momentous treaty is momentous precisely because of its inherent risks, one
76

77

78

79

See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 40 (outlining the distinct procedures for amending
multilateral treaties between all parties and for amending agreements between only specific parties
to the treaty, respectively).
Indeed, as Helfer concludes from his compilation of treaty withdrawal data, “states quit multilateral
treaties with a fair degree of regularity.” Helfer, supra note 47, at 1608.
Christian Dominicé, The International Responsibility of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations, 10 EUR.
J. INT’L. L. 353, 354 (1999).
William James, The Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR
PHILOSOPHY 1, 4 (Longmans, Green, & Co. 1912) (1896).
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should not expect to find layers of similar agreements in force between the parties.
This has sobering consequences for momentous treaty fallout. With ordinary
treaties, like foreign investment treaties, parties could expect to retain foreign
investment within their nations because foreign investors can rely upon a
multitude of overlapping agreements securing their rights as investors, even if the
host nation breached one foreign investment treaty. With momentous treaties,
however, there is little reason to believe that a network of overlapping agreements,
which cement the contentious, indeed volatile, provisions of the momentous
treaty, exists. In the fallout from the momentous treaty, then, there will be no web
of earlier, alternative commitments on which the parties may land.
Fallout from such treaties may also prove to be uniquely dire, either in the
short or long term, relative to the fallout from their ordinary counterparts. Take,
for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).80 Fallout from this
treaty may foreseeably result in the stockpiling and/or readying of nuclear
weapons, at the very least.81 Further, fallout from the NPT may highlight the fact
that trust between the parties to the treaty—or at least the trust between the
breaching party and at least one of the other parties to the treaty—has been made
untenable, rendering a nuclear-contained peace unachievable.82 As a result, both
parties to the treaty, and indeed the entire world, will be subjected to a greater risk
of nuclear war.
This is the case regardless of whether the treaty is bilateral or multilateral.
The relationship between a party’s breach of a bilateral treaty and the nonbreaching party’s obligations with respect to that treaty is fairly simple. In such a
case, the non-breaching party is entitled to terminate or suspend the treaty.83 With
multilateral treaties, the picture becomes more complicated. Recall how a treaty
may be suspended with respect to one or more of the parties to the treaty, under
Article 60.2(b), if those parties are “specifically affected by the breach,”84 or, under
Article 60.2(c), if the breach “radically changes the position of every party to with
respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.”85 Indeed,
Article 60.2(c) was crafted “with so-called integral treaties in mind, e.g., on
80
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See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
See Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation: Why Legal Tools Matter, 34 VT. L. REV. 619, 624 (2010)
(“If [a country] were to suddenly pull out of the NPT and tell the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency] to go home and if it had prepared non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons
in advance, it could produce nuclear arms in a matter of weeks, under some scenarios.”).
See Jan Ruzicka & Vincent Keating, Going Global: Trust Research and International Relations, 5 J. TR. RES.
1, 4 (2015).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 60.1.
Id. at art. 60.2(b).
Id. at art. 60.2(c).
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disarmament, where a State could not suspend the treaty in relation to one party
without violating its obligations toward the others.”86 Article 60.2(b) is created in
the same spirit, but with the recognition that a particular party to a multilateral
treaty may have a unique interest in a specific party’s enforcement of the treaty
and thus a unique right to suspend performance upon that specific party’s
breach.87 In either case, one party’s suspension of a treaty may cause the other
parties to suspend their performance as well. This situation occurred in 2007,
when Russia announced that it would suspend its performance of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). After unsuccessfully attempting to
force Russia’s performance under the treaty, the U.S. and other NATO members,
who were parties to CFE, announced that they would also suspend their
performance.88 This rendered the military stability in Europe that the CFE
established uncertain, undercutting the primary purpose of the treaty.89

C. Challenging the Contract Paradigm
These features of momentous treaties highlight the ways in which trust
between nations will need to play a significant role in securing momentous treaties’
objectives between parties.90 Recall that momentous treaties are rare, unilateral (in
that they do not reify other earlier commitments), and tremendously important.
Given the fundamental premise of international relations—that the world lacks a
consistent and powerful mode of coercive enforcement for international
agreements—it seems implausible to think that coercive powers alone will ensure
compliance with momentous treaties.91 After all, the cost of coercively enforcing
86
87
88

89

90

91

VILLIGER, supra note 2, at 745.
Id.
See Mika Hayashi, Suspension of Certain Obligations of the CFE Treaty by NATO Allies: Examination of the
Response to the 2007 Unilateral Treaty Suspension by Russia, 18 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 131, 133–34 (2013).
An important point to note is that the severity of these kinds of breaches are manifest in externalities
as well. Take the NPT, for example. Breach of that treaty will likely result in another party
“suspending” performance of the treaty in order to create or otherwise militarily prepare a nuclear
stockpile. This exposes all nations to the effects of a catastrophic nuclear war, whose effects simply
cannot be contained. Even so-called “limited” nuclear wars can have ghastly, catastrophic
consequences for both combatant nations and peaceful ones. See Joseph Cirincione, The Continuing
Threat of Nuclear War, in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 381, 386–88, 390–92 (Nick Bostrom & Milan
M. Cirkovic, eds. 2008).
See Jan Ruzicka & Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, 86 INT’L. AFF. 69, 70 (2010) (claiming that the NPT fundamentally establishes a
set of “trusting” relationships between the parties). The scholarship on trust has debated what
exactly is meant by trust in international relations. See Torsten Michel, Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic
Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. REL. 869, 871–74 (2012).
See Druzin, supra note 16, at 455 (“Sanctioning authority is seldom granted by treaties and rarely
used even where it is granted.”).
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such a treaty may well outweigh any possible benefit that would arise from this
coercive exercise.92 In addition, momentous treaties’ unilateral character suggests
that fallout from momentous treaties will not be supported by underlying
agreements that secure the same policy objectives. If this is so, and if momentous
treaties have structural features that render them both uniquely important and
fragile, then trust between parties may be necessary to ensure as much compliance
with momentous treaties as possible.93 Trust is understood as the creation of
overlapping norms and practices such that minimal risk-hedging is required.94 This
kind of trust may arise in the international arena over time when there are repeated
signals that each party is consistently performing their treaty obligations.95 While
trust may be severely undermined by a nation’s breach of a momentous treaty, it
still behooves us to recognize the ex ante value of identifying norms, policies, and
institutions that can play critical roles in creating and promoting trust
between nations.
The contract paradigm for treaty interpretation may be insufficient for
performing this ex ante trust-promoting function for momentous treaties. The key
drawback to the contract paradigm of treaty interpretation is the fact that this
interpretive exercise will be largely cabined to the particular meaning of the treaty’s
text. Of course, the Vienna Convention explicitly eschewed a form of hypertextualism, instead opting for a blended approach that privileges the text and
purpose of the treaty, with reference to the parties’ intent as needed to resolve
ambiguities.96 Yet parties’ obligations, including what constitutes a “material
breach” of those obligations and when such obligations may be suspended by
non-breaching parties, are established largely in reference to some conception of
the meaning of a treaty’s text.97
92
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It should be noted that even economic sanctions have a questionable efficacy in curbing rogue
parties, oftentimes instead placing huge burdens on those parties’ vulnerable, and innocent civilian
populations. See Jana Ilieva, Aleksandar Dashtevski, & Filip Kokotovic, Economic Sanctions in
International Law, 9 UMTS J. ECON. 201, 206–07 (2018).
See Druzin, supra note 16, at 455.
See Vincent Charles Keating & Jan Ruzicka, Trusting Relationships in International Politics: No Need to
Hedge, 40 REV. INT’L. STUD. 753, 761–62 (2014) (correlating a lack of “hedging” with genuine trust
between nations); see also Michel, supra note 90, at 884.
See Druzin, supra note 16, at 437, 442–43.
See Section II.A.
Article 31.3(b) admittedly allows a court to take “into account together with the context . . . Any
subsequent agreement between the parties . . . [or] Any subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the understanding of the parties regarding its interpretation.” Vienna
Convention, supra note 1. These sources of interpretation are all “objective evidence of the
understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty.” Report of the International Law Commission,
supra note 19, at 221. Yet as the Report notes, courts have often resorted to such materials only
when the text was ambiguous. Id. The meaning of the text, then, still reigns supreme in the analysis.

Summer 2020

211

Chicago Journal of International Law

Under the contract paradigm of interpretation, to be sure, international
institutions may not always be wed to the present meaning of a term. Those
institutions may decide that “the parties’ intent upon the conclusion of the treaty
was . . . to give the terms used—or some of them—a meaning or content capable
of evolving, not one fixed once and for all.”98 This method of interpretation,
however, is significantly limited by treaty interpretation’s contract-grounded
premises. Scholars have noted the tremendous difficulty in reconciling treaty
interpretation’s contractual nature with evolutionary interpretation, for
evolutionary interpretation will naturally weaken the certainty and consensual
basis upon which treaties qua contracts are made.99 To limit this negative outcome,
proponents of evolutionary interpretation insist that “evolutionary
interpretation . . . must ultimately refer back to the consent of the parties
themselves and to their common intention.”100 Skeptics, however, highlight the
remaining tension between the interpretive demands of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention and the expansive methodology embodied in evolutionary
interpretation.101 Even the parties’ most abstract obligation—pacta sunt servanda—
directs parties to perform their stipulated obligations in good faith. While this maxim
calls upon parties to perform their treaties not just to accord with the text of those
treaties, it still fundamentally rests on the assumption that the text is what shall
govern over the parties. The contract paradigm, then, renders evolutionary
interpretation unsatisfying: it cannot concurrently provide the certainty that the
contract paradigm requires and the normative expansion that made evolutionary
interpretation initially tempting.
At bottom, it is ironically the commitment to the treaty’s text that jeopardizes
momentous treaties. In order to promote trust between the parties, it may
behoove institutions to relax their central commitment to the text and instead
broaden their analysis to draw upon other sources that may help the feuding
parties repair and build trust. Curing momentous treaties’ insufficiencies and
promoting trust, then, requires rethinking the contract paradigm to which treaty
interpretation has bound itself.

IV. T HE H ISTORICAL A CCOUNT OF C OVENANTS
As discussed, it is pertinent to challenge the contract paradigm of treaty
interpretation in order to promote trust between parties to momentous treaties.
98
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101

Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J.
213, 242 ¶ 64 (July 13) (emphasis added).
See, for example, Catherine Brölmann, Limits of the Treaty Paradigm, in INTERROGATING THE TREATY:
ESSAYS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TREATIES 29, 34–36 (Matthew Craven & Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, eds., 2005).
BJORGE, supra note 17, at 120.
See, for example, RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 470, 473–74 (2d ed. 2015).
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Doing so requires exploring interpretive paradigms that sharply depart from the
contract paradigm. As I shall argue in this Section, the covenant paradigm found in
both ancient Near Eastern societies and the Bible, modified to fit the international
legal context, is a promising candidate to replace the contract paradigm of
momentous treaty interpretation.
Before fully examining the account of “covenant” adopted by this
Comment, it is important to identify the senses of covenant that I will not discuss.
The first sense of covenant that is not explored in this Comment is one that is
similar to an ordinary contract or treaty between two or more parties. Like any
ordinary contract, this first sense of covenant “represents an agreement between
two parties in which there is parity. Both sides enter the treaty voluntarily, resulting
in a partnership relationship.”102 Given the structural similarity between these
covenants and modern contracts and treaties, there is little reason to believe that
this conception of covenant will provide a sufficiently meaningful contrast with
contemporary contracts.
Scholars have also identified a second sense of covenant within the Hebrew
Bible.103 All of these scholars agree that covenants of this second kind are
instantiated in particular, dramatic episodes, such as the creation of the covenant
with Noah104 and the creation of the covenant with the Israelites at Sinai.105 They
disagree, however, as to how to conceptualize the covenants that Noah and the
Israelites made in their respective agreements. Some scholars have compared
these covenants with “suzerainty treaties.”106 These covenants, in sharp contrast to
the contract-like covenants discussed above, were premised upon the covenant
being made between a “vassal” and “king,” “where the vassal is obligated to obey
the commands stipulated by the king.”107 The purpose of this kind of covenant,
its proponents claim, was to “establish a firm,” but unilateral, “relationship of
mutual support between the two parties,” whereby “the emphasis” was placed
upon “the vassal’s obligation to trust in the benevolence of the sovereign.”108 Thus,
on this understanding, one party’s domination over the other and the unilateral

102
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Irvin A. Busenitz, Introduction to the Biblical Covenants: The Noahic Covenant and The Priestly Covenant, 10
THE MASTER’S SEMINARY J. 173, 175 (1999).
See generally Scott Hahn, Covenant in the Old and New Testaments, 3 CURRENTS IN BIBLICAL RES. 263,
264–70 (2005) (surveying critical contributions to the literature analyzing Israelite covenants).
See Genesis 9:1–11 (JPS, trans.).
See, for example, Exodus 17:7.
See George E. Mendenhall, Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition, 27 THE BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGIST 50,
55–56 (1954) (emphasis in original); see also Busenitz, supra note 102, at 176.
Mendenhall, supra note 106, at 55; Busenitz, supra note 102, at 176.
Mendenhall, supra note 106, at 56 (emphasis in original).
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obligations provided by the suzerainty covenant distinguish it from the contractlike account of covenant.
Rejecting this proposal, other scholars—and this Comment—emphasize the
importance and analytical priority of kinship in distinguishing the second sense of
covenant from the first. As Hebrew Bible scholar Frank Moore Cross describes:
The social organization of West Semitic tribal groups was grounded in
kinship. Kinship relations defined the rights and obligations, the duties,
status, and privileges of tribal members, and kinship terminology provided
the only language for expressing legal, political, and religious institutions.109

Originally, the concept of kinship was deeply tethered to blood relations between
family members.110 This way of framing the kinship relationship allowed the
concept to adopt an array of obligations that were incumbent upon kinsmen. Such
obligations included securing the welfare and physical protection of one’s kin,
though these important obligations are by no means distinct to kinship as a
method of constituting political society.111 Kinship’s unique contribution to these
obligations was that it “thickened” these obligations using a variety of emotively
charged concepts.112 For example, love (ahaba) “is kinship language, the bond that
holds together those in intimate relationships, the relationships of family and
kindred.”113 Loyalty (hesed), too, is a fundamental way in which kinsmen are to
interact with each other.114 It is on this unique basis that the Biblical conception
of covenant rests.
Over time, kinship was reshaped and reformed in order to accommodate a
more complex and dynamic political society. As families began coordinating and
living together in political society, blood relationship alone could no longer
provide the grounds for kinship needed to ensure a cohesive society. Thus, early
societies crafted “legal mechanisms or devices—we might even say legal
fictions—” to overcome the lack of blood ties and extend the kinship
relationship.115 Covenant was invented to bridge the gap between two, nonbloodrelated persons or tribes. With a deity as their witness, two parties would “unite
their blood,” as it were, to extend “the duties and privileges of kinship” to each

109
110
111
112
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CROSS, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
“Thickened,” in this context, refers to Bernard Williams’ distinction between “thick” and “thin”
concepts. For the classical discussion of this distinction, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 129, 152 (1985).
CROSS, supra note 8, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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other.116 This innovation allowed the kinship conception of political relations to
extend onto the international scene. Covenants between nations outlined
obligations between nations in “thick” terms that were part and parcel of the
kinship model. Relationships between nations were characterized as “loving” and
the member nations were subscribers to “a treaty of brotherhood.”117 The
language of covenant, then, “is taken from the language of kinship,” and to
understand covenant requires us to appreciate and understand kinship.118
One example of this kind of kinship-infused covenant can be found in the
treaty that was made between the Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Tyre.
To celebrate and thank God for granting him a peaceful and prosperous kingdom,
King Solomon of Israel declares that he will build “a house for the name of the
Lord.”119 Hiram, a “lover” of Solomon’s father David,120 creates a covenant with
Solomon to provide lumber for the construction.121 This treaty is characterized as
a “covenant of brotherhood” between Solomon and Hiram, showing their strong
commitment to one another.122
Additionally, covenants, as distinguished from contracts, are almost always
interminable. Indeed, David Novak takes this property to be one of the essential
features that distinguishes a covenant from a contract.123 Aside from Novak’s
stipulation, however, scholarly works on this point are few and far between, since
theologians, “for the most part, have always assumed” covenants’
interminability.124 Today, scholars hotly debate the extent to which covenants are
terminable or interminable, with particular attention being paid to the Davidic
covenant.125 Despite this scholarly debate, breach of covenant throughout the
Bible consistently results in reckoning and punishment, to be sure, but not a
dissolution of the covenantal relationship. This accords with the kinship account
of covenants. Since a covenant, on the kinship account, is grounded in a legal
fiction that creates a “blood relation” between parties, that “blood relation”
116
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Id. at 8.
Id. at 10 (citing 1 Kings 5:14–26).
Id. at 11.
1 Kings 5:19.
1 Kings 5:15.
1 Kings 5:24–26.
Amos 1:9.
DAVID NOVAK, THE JEWISH SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 35 (2005).
David W. Jones & John K. Tarwater, Are Biblical Covenants Dissoluble? Toward a Theory of Marriage, 47
S.W. J. THEOLOGY 1, 5 (2004). Part of the debate stems from the Hebrew word that is used when
the Bible discusses possible instances of covenant termination (hafreh). It can be understood to refer
to either a breach of a covenant’s terms or a termination of the covenant. Id. at 9.
See Hahn, supra note 103, at 276–77; see also Jones & Tarwater, supra note 124, at 8–9.
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cannot be negated by a simple violation of one’s duties to one’s kin. Nor can it be
negated by the parties’ mutual assent that the covenant be negated; that is, under
a covenant, parties are not entitled to mutually agree to exit the covenant. The
only exception to this is when one acts in such a way as to compromise or negate
one’s identity as a “blood relative” of one’s kin. This is seen throughout the Bible.
Though the Israelites have breached their covenant with God, God consistently
remembers and honors his covenant with the Israelites.126 Yet God also provides
specific commandments relating to covenantal identity; violating these commands
will result in being “cut off” (kareth) from the rest of the Israelites.127 So while
covenants include the concept of breach in the sense that it is physically possible
to violate the terms of the covenant, covenants cannot be terminated except when
one or more parties act so as to “cut off” the kinship between them.
Covenants’ interminability (with one exception, as noted earlier) hints at
another feature: their ability to normatively evolve over time. This means that the
parties may be required to perform new functions due to the covenant that they
previously ratified. Once again, covenants’ foundation in kinship proves to be the
reason for this feature. Covenants create an artificial kinship relationship between
the parties, and it is this relationship that primarily constitutes the core of the
covenant. Indeed, the bonds of love and loyalty provide the grounds for more
concrete duties, such as protecting one’s kin and ensuring that one’s kind received
material welfare during times of hardship. It is therefore this bond of kinship that
allow parties to reify and build upon their previous commitments.
Reification of a covenant, for example, can be found in the Book of
Nehemiah. After the Israelites return from exile in Babylon, Ezra and Nehemiah
rally them to rebuild the lost Israelite society based upon God’s
commandments.128 After the basic infrastructure of the Temple in Jerusalem is
completed, Ezra reads the Torah aloud to the gathered people.129 The people,
recognizing that their sins have caused their earlier demise and exile to Babylon,
recall God’s covenants with their ancestors and assert that God had not
126
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See, for example, Jeremiah 31:35–36
Thus said the Lord, who established the sun for light by day, the laws of the
moon and stars for light by night, who stirs up the sea into roaring waves, whose
name is the Lord of Hosts: If these laws should ever be annulled by Me—
declares the Lord—only then would the offspring of Israel cease to be a nation
before Me for all time.
See also Jones & Tarwater, supra note 124, at 10.
Examples of such commandments include (for a man) failing to be circumcised, see Genesis 17:14,
and eating leavened foods over Passover, see Exodus 12:15,19. See also Mishna, Kerithoth 1:1
(providing a complete list of sins that, according to the Jewish tradition, incur the penalty of being
“cut off” from the covenant between God and the Jewish people).
Nehemiah 2:5, 16–18.
Nehemiah 8:2–5.
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terminated those covenants even when their ancestors had sinned.130 In an effort
to mend their ways, the people reaffirm the previous covenant they had with God,
promising to keep his laws and commandments.131
Building upon a previous covenant can also come in the form of creating a
new covenant between the same parties. This is most explicitly promised in the
Book of Jeremiah. In an eschatological vision, Jeremiah prophesizes that after the
Israelites have suffered in the exile, God will redeem them and return them to the
Land of Israel.132 During that time, God will make a new covenant with the
“House of Israel and the House of Judah:”133 God will put his “Teaching into their
innermost being and inscribe it upon their hearts,”134 all of the Israelites will
observe his commandments and follow the covenant, and God will forgive their
sins.135 These passages, combined with later passages affirming God’s
continuation of the previous covenant with the Israelites, suggest that this new
covenant will simply build upon the old covenant’s foundations.136 Drawing upon
and extending the previous covenant, God will create a new covenant with the
Israelites that includes new obligations on the part of the Israelites. In this way,
covenants can have a kind of normative extension, as it were, by drawing upon
the basic principles and history of an earlier covenant and using those materials to
create new obligations for the parties.137
Before proceeding further, it is important to take stock of this particular
account of covenants. First, covenants are founded in the conceptual framework
of kinship, whereby (originally) blood relations served to bind family members
together through a nexus of obligations and attitudes towards each other. These
obligations and attitudes include, respectively, duties to protect and support, as
well as love and be loyal to, one’s kin. Second, breach of the covenant, in contrast
with contracts, will not terminate the covenant, except if the breach was such that
it fundamentally challenged the kinship between the covenantal parties. Lastly,
covenants can be normatively extended insofar as they can be reified by the parties
130
131

132
133
134
135
136
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Nehemiah 9:6–31.
Nehemiah 10:1, 30; see also NOVAK, supra note 123, at 77–78 (explaining the dynamic between the old
and renewed covenants).
Jeremiah 31:10–14.
Jeremiah 31:31.
Jeremiah 31:33.
Jeremiah 31:34.
See Kaufmann Kohler, New Testament, 9 THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 246, 246 (Isidore Singer, et.
al., eds. 1905).
Thus, the term “new” covenant, under these contexts, would be something of a misnomer. Since
these covenants, in a sense, derive their normative force in large part from the previous covenant,
to a large extent they are not “new.” Nonetheless, given that they are building upon the previous
covenant—in contrast with merely renewing the covenant—these covenants are “new” in the sense
that they have new content and obligations to which the parties must adhere.
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later in time and new commitments can be added to a covenant based on the old
covenant’s normative values and history. Thus, thick obligations and attitudes,
relative inability to be dissolved by breach, and normative evolution distinguish
covenants from contracts.

V. T REATY I NTERPRETATION AS C OVENANT I NTERPRETATION
We can now move from the abstract account of covenants to how covenant
interpretation can be implemented to remedy contract interpretation’s
shortcomings with respect to momentous treaties. Recall how momentous treaties
are unique insofar as they have high transaction costs to negotiate and renegotiate.
Since they are difficult to secure in the first instance, they tend not to reify earlier
commitments that secure the same ends. Fallout from these treaties, in addition,
places a great deal of risk upon the parties and can lead to dire consequences for
the parties. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention’s current scheme allows for the
termination or suspension of momentous treaties under certain circumstances.
This can unravel the progress that nations made while they were still complying
with the treaty. This scheme, and the insistence on focusing on the treaty’s text to
discern its precise meaning—in other words, on interpreting treaties like
contracts—de-emphasizes that which might be most important with momentous
treaties yet might also be scarce: trust between the parties to the treaty.
International institutions, such as the ICJ, can instead conceptualize
momentous treaties as covenants to help remedy these shortcomings. Those
institutions should work tirelessly to ensure that a material breach of a treaty does
not result in a termination of the treaty. Under Article 65 of the Vienna
Convention, parties must announce the grounds for which they wish to terminate
or suspend performance of a treaty.138 In theory, if a party makes that
announcement and does not receive any objection from any other party, then the
announcing party may do as it announced.139 Given momentous treaties’ unique
properties, however, this is unlikely to happen. If a party to a momentous treaty
objects to the termination or suspension of the treaty, then under Article 66,140 the
parties must adjudicate their dispute under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.141 To
be sure, Article 65 allows a party to follow its plan of terminating or suspending a
treaty irrespective of any other party’s response to that plan when there is “special
urgency.”142 A covenant-centered interpretation of this provision would interpret
138
139
140
141

142

Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
Id.
Id. at 348.
U.N. Charter, art. 33 (mandating that the parties to a grave dispute resolve their conflict via
negotiation, arbitration, or litigation, and empowering the Security Council to require such
proceedings for the parties).
Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
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“special urgency” to limit it only to cases in which parties firmly believe that they
are in an existential crisis. Otherwise, parties would be required to resolve their
disputes—indeed, perhaps renew or amend their covenants—before an
international institution. In utilizing the Vienna Convention’s termination-averse
structure, international institutions can help ensure that momentous treaties
remain perpetual in character.
The parties’ shared values should also play a critical role in how international
institutions adjudicate their disputes. Instead of focusing solely on interpreting the
treaty in order to discern its meaning as embodying the parties’ intent (however
that is determined), these institutions can focus on discerning that meaning as well
as, and in the light of, the parties’ history and shared normative values. These
values can be drawn from the original covenant to which every nation has
assented: the U.N. Charter. Article 1 of the Charter spells out the core normative
values on which international relations are to rest: promotion and maintenance of
international peace, the development of friendly relations among nations with a
premium on equal rights of peoples, and achieving international cooperation in
solving global problems.143 As shared values that govern the particular parties’
treaty, these values can importantly serve as the tools with which international
institutions may normatively extend the parties’ obligations.144
These values allow international institutions to afford the parties an
opportunity to reify their covenant or significantly add to it. An international
institution would begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the
dispute arose. Using these materials, the institution would be able to take into
account the covenant’s meaning, as well as the values that the parties share (as
listed above). The institution would then attempt to provide a solution that is
amenable to the parties and best coheres the covenant’s meaning, the normative
principles, and the history (whether good or bad) between the parties.145
With an eye towards the future, these institutions must frame treaty relations
as kinship relations. This can be done by reimagining the duty of good faith to
encompass both historical as well as normative components. Though institutions
cannot plausibly refer to the “blood” that is shared between the two parties,
focusing on kinship relations would call upon institutions to review the history of
the relationship between the two parties, even outside of the context of the

143
144
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U.N. Charter, art. 1.
This is to say nothing about the existence of norms of international law. Such binding norms should
certainly play a role in the analysis if applicable, but my argument here presupposes that no such
norms will be applicable. C.f. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 53 (rendering a treaty void if,
at the time of its “conclusion,” it conflicts with a “peremptory norm of general international law”).
To this extent, the account of interpretation presented here strongly resembles Ronald Dworkin’s
account of “constructive interpretation.” See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–66 (1986).
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(fraught) treaty. Showing bonds of solidarity between the two nations would
encourage these parties—and from an ex ante perspective, future parties who will
be crafting treaties—to strengthen diplomatic bonds and ties between them. Thus,
by engaging in a holistic project of weaving together the treaty’s text, the history
between the parties, their normative principles, and the sense of kinship that must
arise between them for ratifying a momentous treaty, an international institution
may attempt to interpret a momentous treaty not as a contract, but rather as
a covenant.146 While the parties might not comply entirely with the institution’s
ruling, the expressive power of the opinion may well serve to help shift norms for
future treaty-making parties.147
The ICJ’s decision in Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom provides a good
example of how covenant interpretation can be used to adjudicate real-world
disputes.148 In that case, the Marshall Islands claimed that the U.K. was failing “to
fulfil obligations concerning negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” under the NPT.149 The
U.K. objected, claiming that there was an absence of a dispute between itself and
the Marshall Islands. The U.K.’s main claim was that the Marshall Islands did not
inform the U.K. of its dispute and that the two states did not have a precise
disagreement about a shared issue of international law.150 The Marshall Islands
countered that its position regarding nuclear proliferation was inexorably opposed
to the U.K.’s position on the issue, as derived from the U.K.’s pleadings in the
case and other policy positions.151 According to the Marshall Islands, the U.K.
shirking its responsibilities under the NPT—responsibilities that the Marshall

146

147

148

149
150
151

Interestingly, Druzin contends that specific treaty obligations are necessary for encouraging parties
to create bonds of trust between them, for specificity “clarifies who is actually playing the game.”
See Druzin, supra note 16, at 442. This Comment’s account allows for this kind of specificity. Indeed,
institutions are to impose these kinds of specific requirements on the parties in resolving disputes
between them. Where this Comment’s account differs from Druzin’s account is the sources that
may be used to further cement bonds of trust between the parties. While Druzin seemingly wants
to focus solely on the parties’ trust building via the words of their treaty, this Comment’s account
wants to expand the sources from which the parties’ trust may grow to include the parties’ history
and shared normative principles.
See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2021, 2029–
33 (1996) (advocating for the virtues of the expressive powers of law in solving
coordination problems).
Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. 833 (Oct. 15).
Id. at 845, ¶ 22.
Id. at 846-47, ¶¶ 27–28.
Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35.
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Islands insisted the U.K. was obligated to take seriously—constituted a dispute
eligible for adjudication by the ICJ.152
The ICJ, however, concluded otherwise, finding that the Marshall Islands
failed to demonstrate the existence of a dispute between itself and the U.K.153 This
was a surprising conclusion to reach, given the ICJ’s quite liberal pleading
requirements. The parties need not have directly addressed each other about the
issue in question prior to the dispute.154 Rather, the parties may present evidence
that even implicitly demonstrates that they “hold clearly opposite positions” on
the issue at hand.155 While the pleadings may serve as evidence of, or further ratify,
the existence of a dispute between the parties, the proceedings alone cannot
“enable the Court to find that the condition of the existence of a dispute has been
fulfilled in the same proceedings.”156
The Court nonetheless dismissed the case on the grounds that there was no
dispute between the parties. To be sure, the Court noted that the Marshall Islands
have suffered longstanding harms due to nuclear arms testing in its vicinity from
1946 to 1958;157 however, this history alone could not suggest the existence of a
dispute between the Marshall Islands and the U.K.158 Though the Marshall Islands
made statements indicting nuclear powers for failing to negotiate global nuclear
disarmament, the Court found that those statements failed to “articulate[ ] an
alleged breach by the [U.K.] . . . of the NPT.”159 The Court similarly dismissed the
Marshall Islands’ other evidence—the U.K.’s voting record on nuclear
disarmament—urging caution when inferring policy disagreements from a state’s
vote on a resolution.160 The Marshall Islands’ evidence that the U.K. was deaf
towards diplomatic overtures to work towards nuclear disarmament was equally
dismissed. Since the Marshall Islands’ statements regarding nuclear disarmament
could not give the U.K. notice of the disagreement between itself and the Marshall
Islands, the Court concluded that the U.K.’s refusal to participate in nuclear
disarmament negotiations could not ground the existence of a dispute between
the two states.161 Absent such a dispute, then, the Court deemed itself to be
without jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the case.162
152
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Id. at 848, ¶ 35.
Id. at 856–57, ¶ 59.
Id. at 849, ¶ 38.
Id. at 849–50, ¶¶ 38–41.
Id. at 851, ¶ 42.
Id. at 843, ¶ 16.
Id. at 851–52, ¶ 44.
Id. at 854, ¶ 51.
Id. at 855, ¶¶ 55–56.
Id. at 855–56, ¶ 57.
Id. at 856–57, ¶ 59.
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Central to the Court’s analysis—and central to the Court’s failure to
appreciate the Marshall Islands’ position—was its contract paradigm of treaty
interpretation. Motivating the Court’s discussion of civil procedure was the NPT
and its requirement that nations of the world come together to negotiate nuclear
disarmament. That requirement, however, was seemingly interpreted to be a
contractual requirement, one that required at least one of the parties to formally
allege that one of the other parties breached the treaty. Absent such formalities,
however, the Court felt that the proper channels through which a breach of treaty
qua contract claim could be made were not utilized. Thus, under the contract
paradigm of interpretation, the Court dismissed the case.
A different conclusion would be reached by using the covenant paradigm of
interpretation. As we have already seen, the NPT is a paradigmatic momentous
treaty to which it would be appropriate to apply the covenant paradigm of
interpretation.163 Recall how covenant interpretation presents essentially three
main features: thick obligations and attitudes that establish a kinship relationship
between the parties, relative inability to be dissolved by breach, and the covenant’s
normative evolution. Neither the U.K. nor the Marshall Islands claimed that the
NPT dissolved due to a party’s breach. Indeed, the difficulty of this case in part
lies in the fact that it was an open question as to whether one party failed to comply
with the NPT to such a degree that there was a sufficient “dispute” for the ICJ to
adjudicate.
The parties’ history, however, is illuminating for this case. Having been
exposed to the effects from nuclear weapons testing from 1946–1959, the
Marshall Islands knew firsthand the toxic effects that such weapons would have
for generations to come.164 Indeed, the Court recognized that the Marshall Islands,
“by virtue of the suffering which its people endured as a result of it being used as
a site for extensive nuclear testing programs, has special reasons for concern about
nuclear disarmament.”165 To be sure, the U.K. never tested its nuclear weapons in
the Marshall Islands.166 Yet the U.K. benefitted from the testing and arms
development that arose out of those tests.167 Recognition of the negative
externalities that would inevitably result from the use of nuclear weapons,
163
164
165
166
167

See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text.
See Marsh. Is. v. U.K., 2016 I.C.J. at 843, ¶ 16.
Id. at 851, ¶ 44.
See id. at 843, ¶ 16.
As the Court notes, the U.S. tested nuclear weapons near the Marshall Islands. See id. Immediately
after the period in which the U.S. stopped testing nuclear weapons near the Marshall Islands, it
entered into a treaty with the U.K. to exchange information relating to nuclear weapons. See Atomic
Energy: Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes, U.S.-U.K., art. II, July 3, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 1028.
Thus, while the U.K. did not test nuclear weapons near the Marshall Islands, it reaped the benefits
of a nation that did expose the Marshall Islands to nuclear weapons’ noxious consequences.
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including in testing such weapons, caused the nations of the world, including the
U.K., to come together in 1968 to create the NPT and to work towards a nuclear
arms-free world.168 The fundamental, underlying reality that motivated the
creation of the NPT in the first instance—the existence of nuclear and nonnuclear powers, respectively—further suggests that the harms arising from nuclear
armament uniquely stemmed from nuclear-armed states.169 The Marshall Islands,
in its statements made in multilateral fora, arguably sought to press all of the
nuclear-armed states, including the U.K., to live up to their obligations under the
NPT.170
Furthermore, the normative valence and purpose of the NPT is quite clear.
Article VI of the NPT calls on nations to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms
race and towards nuclear disarmament.171 Article 1.1 of the U.N. Charter is equally
clear: the U.N. is directed, in part, “to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to peace.”172 Working towards a world devoid
of nuclear weapons seems to fall directly under Article 1.1’s aegis. It seems all too
clear, then, that the NPT speaks in favor of nations having to justify their nuclear
weapons-related activities. Consequently, the burdens for mitigating those harms
and the risks associated with those harms should fall on those states engaging in
nuclear weapons-related activities.
Taking these two points together, a covenant paradigm of interpretation
would conclude that the ICJ should reach the merits of the case at hand. Creating
a trusting kinship relationship between the Marshall Islands and the U.K. requires
drawing on the parties’ shared history and the normative valence of the treaty that
they signed. The Marshall Islands’ history of devastation at the hands of nuclear
weapons testing suggests that it uniquely has claims against nuclear powers to work
towards a world without nuclear weapons. Moreover, the clear normative valence
of the NPT speaks in favor of shifting the burden onto the nuclear powers to
justify their retention and/or use of any nuclear weapons. While the NPT may not
have explicitly allowed for the kind of petition filed by the Marshall Islands, both
the Marshall Islands’ history and the NPT’s normative valence points to the ICJ
incorporating that right into the NPT. Indeed, creating a sense that the U.K. must
protect its “kin” requires the Court to allow the Marshall Islands to voice its
claims, especially when, as here, the U.K.’s voting-record on nuclear disarmament
and its pleadings suggest that the U.K. was not taking some of its obligations
under the NPT seriously.173 Interpreting the NPT under a covenant paradigm,
168
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See Marsh. Is. v. U.K., 2016 I.C.J. at 843 ¶ 18.
See id. at 843–44, ¶ 19.
See id. at 852–53, ¶ 48.
See id.; see also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 80.
U.N. Charter, art. 1.1.
See Marsh. Is. v. U.K., 2016 I.C.J. at 848, ¶ 35.
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then, would suggest creating an opportunity for the Marshall Islands to hold the
U.K. to account for its possible violations of the NPT.
Although the covenant paradigm of interpretation is newly advanced in this
Comment, the ICJ has at times made steps toward adopting covenant
interpretation when engaging with momentous treaties. One rather imperfect
example comes from the ICJ’s advisory opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, where the Court determined that nations have the obligation to
negotiate nuclear disarmament, as discussed above.174 While the Court was not
asked to interpret one treaty—it was asked to determine whether the threat or use
of nuclear weapons was ever sanctioned under international law—the Court’s
methodology is illuminating. After surveying the international legal norms and
treaties, the Court concluded that international law did not sanction the use of
nuclear weapons.175 It also held, however, that there was no settled state practice
that prohibited the use of nuclear weapons when used in a defensive capacity and
when a nation’s existence is threatened.176 The Court, then, recognized two
conflicting realities. On the one hand, states have not used nuclear weapons since
1945; on the other hand, states have stockpiled nuclear weapons for the purpose
of deterring other states’ aggressive behavior. Lastly, the Court reminded the
General Assembly that states were obligated, under the NPT, to actively, and in
good faith, negotiate agreements that would lead to total nuclear disarmament.177
In one sense, the Court’s admonition that states must work toward a world
without nuclear weapons is entirely orthogonal to the question at hand. As Judge
Shahabuddeen noted in dissent, the General Assembly did not ask the Court to
address the question of whether states have an obligation to work towards nuclear
disarmament under the NPT.178 This may be because states’ obligation to work
towards nuclear disarmament is separate and aside from the question of whether
states, currently armed with nuclear weapons, may use them under
certain circumstances. The Court’s holistic approach, however, recognized the
covenantal nature of the NPT. While states are currently not in a position to
simply abandon and destroy their nuclear weapons, the Court synthesized this
sober reality with the states’ obligation to work towards a more peaceful and less
hostile world.
Still, the majority’s opinion leaves much to be desired in the way of covenant
interpretation. Ideally speaking, the majority should have consulted the history of
nuclear proliferation, the history of the nations coming together to resolve to
174
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Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 267
¶ 105(2)(F) (July 8).
Id. at 266, ¶ 105(2)(A).
Id. at ¶ 105(2)(B).
Id. at 267, ¶ 105(2)(F).
Id. at 378 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
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abandon their nuclear weapons under the NPT, and the normative principles
contained in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter. It should have also pressed the General
Assembly to see how its own practices are inconsistent with the history of the
NPT and the normative principles contained in the U.N. Charter. Despite its
shortcomings, the opinion provides a glimmer of what a covenantal interpretive
paradigm for momentous treaties can look like.

VI. C ONCLUSION
Treaty interpretation has largely found itself in the grip of a contract
paradigm of interpretation. This paradigm largely centers on the primacy of the
treaty’s text and the meaning of that text as the locus of obligations for the parties.
This paradigm has ostensibly worked well for ordinary treaties but would likely
not fare well with respect to momentous treaties. Ordinary treaties have relatively
low transaction costs for negotiation and renegotiation, and they also reify earlier
treaty agreements that were previously ratified by the parties. Breaching ordinary
treaties, then, by no means leads to disastrous consequences. In contrast,
momentous treaties are rather costly to create and renegotiate and thus are
relatively rare to complete. Fallout from a momentous treaty would be all the more
calamitous relative to its ordinary counterparts. As such, momentous treaties need
unique treatment to promote trust between the parties. This kind of treatment
would require weakening the momentous treaty interpretation’s marriage to the
text—a key feature of the contract paradigm of interpretation. A covenant
paradigm of interpretation can serve as an alternative to the contract paradigm of
interpretation. The covenant paradigm of interpretation is unique insofar as it
grounds interpretation in kinship relations, it renders agreements relatively
interminable, and it allows agreements to be normatively extended based on the
parties’ shared principles and history. This covenant paradigm of interpretation is
able to resolve the problems that arose when applying the contract paradigm of
interpretation to momentous treaties.
Of course, the contract paradigm of interpretation is aimed not only at
providing a promising account of momentous treaty interpretation, but also of
legal interpretation as well. When similar dynamics arise in other contexts—
perhaps in the realm of American constitutional law179—there is good reason to
believe that covenant interpretation would be appropriate to apply there as well.
Perhaps even in circumstances that are far less dire, such as with ordinary treaties,
covenant interpretation can serve as a helpful challenge to the contract interpretive
hegemony. I do not argue for such extensions of the covenant paradigm of
interpretation and it is for future scholarship to determine whether this paradigm
179

See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (“Our Constitution
is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us, and then to
future generations.”).
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would appropriately apply to those contexts. It is my hope, however, that at the
very least, this Comment has shown the covenant paradigm of interpretation to
be an attractive alternative to the contract paradigm of interpretation.
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